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ABSTRACT. In the Dutch central government (following countries like New 
Zealand, Australia and the UK) a system of resource budgeting is being 
developed as a substitute for its present dual system of cash/commitment 
budgeting for core departments and accrual accounting for executive agencies. 
Advocates of this approach claim that resource budgeting will improve the 
allocation of government spending and increase efficiency in government 
production. A basic flaw of the reform proposals is the failure to acknowledge 
the hybridity of government activities and the need to accommodate these 
hybridities in the accounting system. We argue that the present dual system, 
with some minor revisions, will be superior to the proposed resource budgeting 
system. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his Budget Memorandum 2001 the Dutch Minister of Finance 
announced the replacement, effective in 2007, of the central 
government’s present cash/commitment accounting system with an 
accrual accounting system. Similar reforms have occurred in New 
Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom. At state and local levels in 
the USA, a shift towards accrual accounting is realized with the 
introduction of GASB 34. In general, the reform is driven by the motive 
to enhance efficiency in government, in accordance with the ideas 
developed under the heading of “new public (financial) management.” 
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 The intended reform in the Netherlands will apply to both financial 
reporting and budgeting with accruals embedded in the budgetary 
accounts in stead of being working paper adjustments to produce accrual-
based annual financial statements. Accrual budgeting, however, poses 
unique problems that reach beyond the widely discussed peculiarities of 
asset valuation (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000). In the pursuit of 
accrual budgeting, fundamental differences between the concepts 
underlying budgetary and commercial accounting are involved that 
justify some general attention and analysis, which is the purpose of this 
paper. 
 The proposed use of accruals in government budgeting will shift the 
focus to the resources consumed rather than to the results obtained. This 
represents a restricted form of accrual accounting frequently 
characterized as “resource budgeting,” in accordance with the label 
applied to the UK’s reforms (White & Hollingsworth, 1997; Likierman, 
1998), that may be interpreted as a compromise solution between 
budgetary and commercial accounting. In this solution, authorized 
budgets should fulfill a dual function as both ”ceiling on expenses” and 
“revenue earned” (Robinson, 2002, p. 88). 
 We believe that this quest for a compromise between budgetary and 
commercial accounting has some major flaws. The intended Dutch 
reform may be evaluated as an attempt to establish a degree of 
uniformity in accounting that denies rather than accommodates the 
hybridity inherent in government activities. In this paper, we will argue 
for a dual accounting system combining a cash basis for the core 
departments of central government and an accrual basis for its executive 
agencies.  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, some 
background information on the Dutch reform proposals is provided. 
Next, the contradictions between budgetary and commercial accounting 
implied in the proposals will be analyzed. Third, we argue the relevance 
of these contradictions, specifically with respect to levels of government 
which combine substantial powers to tax with substantial executive tasks 
in production (in the Dutch context, for central government contrary to 
supra national EU on the one hand and sub national provinces and 
municipalities on the other hand). Fourth, we describe the Dutch 
proposals in more detail, as they have been subsequently developed and 
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adopted in the Budget Memorandum 2002 (issued September 2001).1 
The two major objectives of the ”resource budgeting” reform are 
scrutinized: (1) the objective to enhance a balanced decision making with 
respect to government investment and consumption and (2) the objective 
to generate accounting information on efficiency in government 
production. We argue the reform is flawed in both respects. Finally, the 
development of present Dutch central government accounting into a dual 
“hybrid” accounting system is proposed as an alternative.  
DUTCH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING REFORM 
 Traditionally the Dutch central government uses a cash accounting 
and budgeting system.  Since the 1980s when significant budget deficits 
occurred, the budgeting system also incorporates outstanding 
commitments. As a result, central government budgeting and accounting 
are predominantly tuned to the need for expenditure controls to help 
ward off such deficits. Hence, both commitments and disbursements are 
subjected to budgetary spending limits. 
 By the 1990s, with expenditure control firmly established, the 
efficiency and effectiveness of government performance became the 
prominent issue for political debate and the cash/commitment accounting 
and budgeting system was criticized on two points: (1) the crowding-out 
of investment by consumption induced by the system and (2) the lack of 
information about government efficiency generated by it. To address 
these concerns, budgeting and accounting were modified in two respects. 
To protect investment – specifically in the physical and economic 
infrastructure of society, considered neglected during the 1980s – two 
investment funds were created (the Infrastructure Fund and the Fund for 
the Strengthening of the Economic Structure), to earmark certain 
revenues for investment purposes within the present cash/commitment 
budgeting and accounting system. Central government expenditure on 
investment may now be budgeted either from these specific funds or 
from the general budget (for criticisms, see Boorsma and Mol, 1997). 
 To measure efficiency, government agencies involved in the supply 
of goods and services were required to provide information on costs and 
revenues. For these agencies, the possibility of accrual accounting was 
established in 1994 in an amendment to the Government Budgeting and 
Accounting Act 1976. As a consequence, two accounting systems 
presently co-exist in central government. 
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 According to Budget Memorandum 2001, the introduction of accrual 
accounting ”government wide” could make both partial solutions 
superfluous. We will argue, however, that this ”general solution” 
represents mere window dressing. It does not address the hybridities 
inherent in government activities, as our analysis of this attempt to 
reconcile the characteristics of budgetary and commercial accounting 
will reveal.  
ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS 
 In budgetary accounting, the fundamental question to be answered is 
“How do I keep track of my spending?”  For governments, this question 
is induced by the origin of their income from taxation. Budgeted 
expenditure should be tuned to the tax income levied from society. The 
primary function of accounting is to provide accountability with respect 
to expenditure in accordance with the authorizations underlying the 
budget. When budgets are derived from tax income recognized in cash 
receipts, accounting for expenditure on a cash basis (as disbursements) 
will establish a direct linkage between annual income and expenditure. 
Alternatively, however, budget authorizations may be framed in 
modified cash or commitments. Expenditure then would have to be 
accounted for accordingly. 
 On the contrary, in commercial accounting the fundamental question 
is “Are the revenues I receive sufficient to generate an income?” This 
point of view is relevant in any situation where continuation of an 
organization is not guaranteed by an inexhaustible resource of funds, but 
has to be earned by creating a market for goods and services from which 
income can be generated. Commercial accounting is supported by 
accrual accounting systems, which provide the possibility to match costs 
and revenues and to account for the changes in values of assets owned by 
the organization. This is why accrual accounting constitutes ”generally 
accepted accounting” in business administration. 
 Thus, in budgetary accounting income spending is the relevant 
activity to be monitored, while commercial accounting focuses on 
income earning. Perrin (1998, p. 10) confirms this emphasis on spending 
by stating that ex ante information is the more important issue in public 
sector budgeting – instead of ex post information on profits or losses in 
private business. The distinction may be further conceptualized in Table 
1. 




Conceptualization of Income Spending and Income Earning 
 Income spending Income earning 
With respect to Consumption Production 
Aiming at Allocation (utility) Efficiency (value added) 
By Budgeting Pricing 
In Budgetary accounting Commercial accounting 
Focusing on Ex ante budgets Ex post accounts 
Specifying Availability for spending Results obtained 
By Authorization of expenditure Matching revenue and cost 
 
 As levying and spending tax income for public consumption 
primarily characterize economic behavior of government, budgetary 
accounting will determine its basic accounting system. This system 
should specifically apply to the legislative budgets of government. 
Executive government appropriates these budgets in accordance with 
authorizations by the legislative bodies of government. Spending should 
be accounted for in relation to these authorizations. Neither the 
realization principle nor the matching principle of business 
administration can be applied. Utilities to be derived from expenditure 
are not expressed as ”revenues” in the accounts. Matching cost and 
revenue in terms of these utilities can thus assess no ”value added.” 
 In budgetary accounting, the principles of authorization and 
compliance are the relevant substitutes for the realization and matching 
principles of business administration. The authorization principle may be 
interpreted as the counterpart of the realization principle. The compliance 
principle will fulfill the role of matching actual expenditure to this 
budget. 
 We may note that budgetary accounting on a cash (or modified cash) 
basis can be deficient because it does not account for commitments prior 
to the actual expenditure of budgets allocated. Therefore, cash 
accounting may be supplemented by accounting of commitments to 
strengthen expenditure control – as is presently the case in Dutch central 
government. However, such amendments to cash accounting do not alter 
the basic objective of budgetary accounting to monitor income spending. 
Commercial accounting aiming at the determination of income earned 
does not contribute to this purpose and may thus be considered irrelevant 
from the point of view of legislative budgeting. 
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Nevertheless, in the production of goods and services by 
government, efficiency may become a leading objective. The 
determination of “value for money” will then become essential. As a 
result, some reconciliation between budgetary and commercial 
accounting is needed. Consequently, a distinction between the allocation 
of resources to public programs in accordance with (social) utilities and 
the use of resources in the activities of government itself is also needed. 
CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION IN GOVERNMENT 
 Public (legislative) budgeting focuses primarily on public 
consumption: the supply of public goods and services by spending 
government tax income, as opposed to the consumption of individual 
goods by the citizens themselves. Incidence of production of these public 
goods and services is an issue of secondary concern. Production may be 
outsourced to the private sector or to autonomized government agencies. 
Whenever supply is paid for by taxes, accountability with respect to 
public goods and services ultimately consumed will prevail. However, 
hybridity may arise here in two respects: (1) if public consumption is 
provided through government production, efficiency in production may 
be as relevant to the taxpayers as getting their money’s worth for the 
goods and services in the public package, and (2) governments may 
supply products produced under the budget and the market mechanism 
simultaneously. 
 The actual relevance of these hybridities will depend upon the 
specific characteristics of public finances in governments. From the 
perspective of the Netherlands, we have to distinguish the supra national 
level of the European Union (EU), the national level of Dutch central 
government and the sub national level of the provinces and 
municipalities.  
 At the level of the European Union, income is nearly exclusively 
derived from upward tax sharing and expenditure consists 
overwhelmingly of transfer payments. Efficiency in EU production may 
therefore be considered of little importance. The need to include 
elements of accrual accounting at this level of government is negligible. 
On the contrary, problems in enforcing compliance in income spending 
call for a strengthening of budgetary control mechanisms. 
 At the sub national level the reverse holds true. More than 80% of 
local Dutch government’s income is generated through transfers from the 
548  MOL & KRUIJF 
 
 
national government and only 8% is generated by taxation (mostly real 
estate property tax). Moreover, local taxation is subject to strict 
regulations set by central government. Consequently, it is nearly 
impossible to cover deficits with additional taxation. 
 The high dependence on grants implies that ”balancing the budget” 
is the main financial management objective in local government. Not 
surprisingly, this objective has been codified as such by a legal 
requirement in Local Government Act 1992 and is monitored by 
provincial and national government. In view of this requirement, 
accounting information with respect to income earned – surpluses or 
deficits of revenues over costs – will be more fundamental than 
information on the specific purposes of income spent. To ensure the 
continuity of local government’s supply of goods and services, local 
governments need an accrual accounting system in order to monitor the 
preservation of their assets.2 
 Similar arguments apply at the national level to the autonomized 
governmental organizations created in the Netherlands in considerable 
numbers since the 1980s (Van Thiel, 2000, pp. 5-7). Generally, for these 
organizations, income is based on the provision of products and services 
to or on behalf of the central government. Since these autonomized 
governmental organizations usually have no legal basis to levy taxes, 
they should also use the accrual accounting system. 
 In contrast, the Dutch central government exemplifies the hybridities 
distinguished above. Government expenditure does cover central 
government production for about 20% -  enough to raise questions with 
respect to efficiency of production in the executive agencies involved, 
but not enough to make this efficiency the major concern in public 
finance. Income is derived to a large extent from taxes – but not 
exclusively. Non-tax revenues, revenues from sale of assets and services 
specifically, encompass substantial amounts of money. Hence, it is  
rather evident that adjustment to these hybridities is a matter of some 
concern at this level of government.  
 The Dutch quest for a governmental type of accrual accounting may 
be recognized as an attempt to maintain uniformity notwithstanding the 
increasing variety of activities central government performs. The 
intended budget reform may exemplify a general attempt to harmonize 
hybridity and uniformity requirements and is discussed in the next 
section to assess its potential. 
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ACCRUALS IN DUTCH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETING 
 The intentions expressed in the Budget Memorandum 2001 (dating 
from September 2000) were further developed in a report, “State of the 
Art Budgeting,” issued by the Department of Finance in July 2001. In 
this report the two main objectives of accrual accounting stated in the 
Budget Memorandum 2001 – to prevent crowding-out of government 
investment by consumption and to improve efficiency in government 
production – are reconfirmed. With respect to these objectives, the 
necessity to distinguish between current and capital expenditures is 
emphasized, as well as the relevance of full cost calculations including 
depreciation and capital charges. 
 Nevertheless, commitments will continue to be authorized in 
legislative budgets, and cash limitations will continue to be imposed in 
view of the (European) Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) deficit 
requirements and liquidity planning. Moreover, the report presumes that 
for about 97% of central government expenditure the equation “cash = 
cost” will hold. Thus accrual accounting will be relevant for only about 2 
billion euro in the yearly budget. 
 Notwithstanding widespread doubts on the benefits of the substantial 
administrative adaptations required by the reform, the proposals in the 
study were adopted with only one minor amendment in Budget 
Memorandum 2002 (September 2001). The year 2007 has been set as a 
target for the full implementation of the reform.  
 Basically, the reform will just imply an adjustment of capital 
expenditure to express capital cost in the budget. Current expenditure on 
personnel and material and transfer payments will remain to be 
recognized on a cash basis. An example presented in the “State of the Art 
Budgeting” report (Ministry of Finance, 2001) may clarify the intended 
accrual budgeting in the reform. In this example, a budget for purpose X 
(budgets are distinguished in a program format) in fiscal year t+1 might 
consist of: 
 - Personnel (current costs) = 30 
 - Material (current costs) =  10 
 - Depreciation =   2  + 2 + 0.4 + 2 + 1 
 - Capital charge =   0,6 
 - Non-ESA investment =  35 
 - Subsidies (transfer payments) = 50 
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 In the budget, current costs of personnel and material as well as 
transfer payments and investments not recognized as such according to 
the European System of Accounts (ESA) will be accounted for on a cash 
basis. Adjustments to cash are limited to ESA capital, for which 
depreciation and capital charges will be included in the budget. 
 The calculation of these charges is explained in the report as follows. 
Depreciation is based on an amount of ESA recognized investments of 
10 per 1/1 year t and 10 per 1/7 year t, both with an economic life span of 
5 years, with a current purchasing power adjustment of 2% of asset value 
per 31/12 year t (we may note here an error in the calculation presented: 
0,4 is the full amount of the revaluation, not the additional depreciation 
to be derived from it), plus an amount of intended ESA recognized 
investments of 10 per 1/1 year t+1 and 10 per 1/7 year t+1, both with an 
economic life span of 5 years. The capital charge is calculated as 0,6 = 
4% of (10 + 10*(6/12)). 
 The first question of our investigation of the reform will then be to 
what extent the advantages attributed to accrual budgeting generally will 
be preserved in these adjusted expenditure calculations. Secondly, the 
ambiguities in the concepts of expense and expenditure underlying these 
adjustments will be addressed.  
EVALUATION OF THE REFORM 
 According to Budget Memorandum 2002 the proposed calculation of 
capital costs will provide the possibility to assess full costs of 
government activities. The determination of full costs is considered the 
key driver in the reform to both objectives of efficiency improvement 
and enhancement of government investment. The relevance of full costs 
to these objectives, however, is both misconceived and overstated. A 
misconception occurs in the argument that the calculation of capital costs 
will enable the assessment of life cycle costs for investment proposals. 
This is obviously not the case since future maintenance costs are left out 
of the calculation. Moreover, investment appraisals should be based on 
(present values of) future flows of costs and benefits rather than annual 
charges for the initial investment expenditure. Second, it is being 
suggested that the reform would enable the calculation of full costs of 
production. However, in the budget, only resource costs for program 
categories are involved. Thus the budgetary accounts will express costs 
of personnel, material and capital but not costs of production: 
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government production involved in the program is not being measured 
for the program as such; only a set of indicators for intended outcomes 
will be provided. The contribution of the reform to the improvement of 
efficiency – if any - will necessarily be restricted to economy gains 
derived from annual cost rather than total expenditure comparisons with 
respect to capital outlays themselves. 
 Apart from these misconceptions, the relevance of the intended full 
cost calculations is being overstated. Generally, these calculations will be 
of limited relevance for decision-making; as in any decision only 
avoidable costs with respect to the issue decided upon are considered. So 
in budgetary decision-making, capital costs will only be avoidable in the 
initial decision on the investment. This might be the first budget year to 
which the capital costs of the investment are charged, but usually 
investment decisions will be made long before actual costs are incurred. 
Hence, the existing (Dutch) practice of accounting for commitments 
handles this adequately. Indeed, in the reform, only cash accounting is at 
stake, the present system of accounting for commitments – unknown in 
commercial accounting – will be continued. Evidently, the allocation of 
expenditure to investment and consumption purposes, respectively, will 
not be determined by the capital costs in the annual budget, but to a large 
extent by the obligations incurred. 
 Furthermore, substantial capital outlays are excluded from the capital 
cost calculations. First, subsidies may consist of capital transfers instead 
of income transfers, but will nonetheless be budgeted according to cash 
disbursements. Thus the misallocation between consumption and 
investment to be amended by the reform may result in a new distortion 
between central government investments and decentralized investments 
financed by capital transfers. 
 Similar distortions are involved in the distinction of ESA and non-
ESA categories of investment. In itself, the choice for ESA to separate 
capital from current expenditure is rather to be expected, as ESA is 
already underlying the EMU requirements for public sector budgeting. 
As government accounts are set up according to ESA definitions and 
principles to assess surpluses or deficits in view of EMU deficit 
limitations, the same definitions may be used to determine relevant 
investments and the same principles to assess asset values for those 
investments. The application of ESA – contrary to the International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) – is thereby defended in the 
State of the Art Budgeting report because of the detailed guidelines 
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specified in this system. To guarantee sound budgetary behavior very 
specific principles for asset valuation are needed. In this respect IPSAS 
are considered too vague. 
 However, precision in the definition of capital expenditure provided 
by ESA may counter validity. Thus, some categories of government 
investment may be unintentionally excluded from ESA definitions. 
Specifically weapon systems for defense are defined as ”government 
consumption” – presumably alright from a macro-economic point of 
view, but somewhat awkward with respect to the intended improvement 
of efficiency and allocation to consumption and investment purposes. In 
the UK – not subject to EMU regulations – investments in defense are 
indeed included as capital expenditure in the resource budgets, 
notwithstanding the necessary reconciliation of the accounts to ESA for 
external reporting purposes (U.K. Ministry of Defense, 2001 pp. 27-28). 
 Generally, the detailed guidelines provided by ESA are not 
specifically tuned to the characteristics of capital owned by government, 
as this defense example illustrates. In the past, the Dutch minister of 
Finance has stressed the distinct characteristics of government 
investments in “the physical, economic and social infrastructure” 
provided by government. In considering any expenditure as a social 
investment, a wide range of arguments may be brought to the fore. 
Ultimately, the attribution of future social utilities underlying the 
creation of social capital will be politically determined. 
 The decision to apply a specific principle to distinguish between 
current and capital expenditure is and should be a political one. The 
narrow interpretation forced upon government by the application of the 
ESA definitions, combined with the exclusion of capital transfers from 
these definitions in central government budgeting (contrary to the 
inclusion in the consolidated public sector accounts in determining the 
relevant EMU deficits) explains the nearly negligible 3% of the budget 
actually affected by the reform (cf. Guthrie, 1998:13-14, on the potential 
significance of the differences between cash and accrual based 
allocations of financial resources). With this percentage in mind, a 
number of issues are raised with respect to the complicated 
administrative adjustments involved in the reform. Obviously, the 
calculated depreciation and capital charges introduce a lot of 
bookkeeping, not representing any decision making in the budget. The 
transparency of the authorizations in the present cash/commitment 
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accounting system (both expenditures and obligations are clear-cut 
objects of decision making) is thereby impaired. From this perspective 
we will discuss these adjustments in more detail in the next section. 
DETERMINATION OF CAPITAL COSTS 
 In accordance with ESA, capital costs will have to be based upon 
some ‘actual value’ asset valuation, contrary to IPSAS 17 and GASB 34 
which use historic cost. From this valuation, subsequent depreciation and 
capital charges will be derived. This orientation at actual values also 
opposes the present historic cost valuation requirements in (Dutch) sub 
national government and in the accruals using agencies in central 
government itself. Apart from this confusing idiosyncrasy, the 
assessment of actual values  will  pose a lot of difficulties for the central 
government assets involved. 
 The solution proposed encompasses a choice between actual market 
values – whenever they can be assessed – or inflation adjusted historic 
costs (implying a variety of current purchasing power accounting). We 
will discuss this solution from two perspectives: (1) the arbitrariness and 
the need to establish an independent supervising authority to monitor its 
application, and  (2) the relevance with respect to decision-making. 
 To apply market based (actual) valuations, it is necessary to assess 
the relevance and precision of available market prices on a case-by-case 
basis. Obviously, budgetary implications may lead to strategic behavior 
in these assessments. Here – and in other unsolved issues in the 
application of accrual accounting – the deus ex machina of an 
“independent supervising body” is invoked. Fears of manipulated 
statements are such that doubts are being expressed if even the Court of 
Audit – working on behalf of parliament – would be sufficiently 
independent to fulfill this task. 
 The independence sought can only be provided by private accounting 
supervisors, as established in New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
(White & Hollingsworth, 2001, pp. 52-53). Such supervisors will have to 
comply to the International Accounting Standards (IAS) developed for 
the private sector, in which social – non-financial - benefits will be 
excluded from the valuation, even where they are decisive for the 
upkeep, replacement or sale of the assets involved (cf. Lundquist, 2001, 
p. 28, challenging IAS 36 in this respect). Asset valuation based upon 
irrelevant actual market values will impair the transparency of the 
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accounts to the political decision makers for whom those accounts are 
primarily intended. 
 Apart from the peculiarities of government assets, valuation in 
accordance with IAS to determine capital costs in government budgeting 
may be critized from the financial accounting/management accounting 
distinction (Jones, 1998, pp. 13-14). The ultimate (management 
accounting) objective to determine costs of services provided will not 
benefit from the restrictions imposed by this (financial accounting) 
framework for an independent asset valuation. 
 Robinson (1998a) discusses in general terms the decision relevance 
of the application of actual values in determining cost of capital. To 
reflect opportunity costs, assets should be valued at net realizable value. 
The intention to use actual value or current purchasing power accounting 
instead implies incorporating substantial sunk costs in budgeted capital 
costs. In the end however, the relevance of actual value or current 
purchasing power accounting is defended by Robinson based on the 
concept of “intergenerational equity.” According to Musgrave and 
Musgrave, this criterion is specified as “the ‘golden rule’ that tax payers 
in each time period should finance all current expenditure and should 
make a contribution to the financing of inherited productive assets 
commensurate with the benefits they receive from those assets” 
(Musgrave & Musgrave, 1973, p. 607). From this conceptualization, 
Robinson infers that “spreading the costs of such assets over their 
lifespan implies that valuation methodology should be based upon the 
actual cost (in real terms) of productive assets” (Robinson, 1998a, p. 32). 
 In our view, this inference is invalid. Taxation for investment 
purposes imposes a burden for the lifespan of the capital involved, but 
not necessarily beyond this period. In principle, future generations may 
decide again if they want the capital to be replaced – and burden 
themselves at that moment with the financing of those replacements. 
Thus, in the investment decision only the authorized capital expenditure 
is at stake. Valuation in accordance with historic costs will ensure that 
the golden rule is observed. 
 Subsequent to the issue of asset valuation the derivation of 
depreciation and capital charges from asset values may be discussed. The 
intended capital charges may be considered as purely ‘nominal,’ unless 
they represent opportunity costs with respect to the use of capital 
(Robinson, 1998b). 
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 Charges for the use of capital should not be applied to all assets 
(legally) owned by government, but only to those (economically) used in 
the production of government services. The calculation of depreciation 
and capital charges with respect to all ESA recognized investments – and 
the neglect of user costs for all non-ESA capital expenditure - does not 
satisfy this requirement. 
 ESA explicitly separates assets on the basis of legal ownership. 
Accordingly capital charges should be budgeted for government 
participations valued as assets on the government’s balance sheet 
(government owned companies like Schiphol Airport etc.) as well. 
Obviously, no authorization to spend income is implied in such budgeted 
capital charges at all.  
 Nominal (administratively determined) capital charges in budgets 
obscure the authorizations ultimately transmitted through those budgets. 
These charges thereby may have disturbing consequences from a 
legislative point of view. They do not represent objects of decision 
making for which executive spenders may be held accountable. They are 
strictly non-controllable; compliance to the authorizations may only be 
observed in a purely formal sense. 
 With respect to capital ownership, resource costs will be determined 
for the economic lifespan of the assets when the investment decision is 
being made. Budgeting for capital expenditure will therefore have to 
address capital expenditure itself. Authorization of investment may then 
be directly aimed at the long-term decisions involved by separating 
capital budgets from current ones – as exemplified by the creation of 
investment funds in present Dutch central government budgeting. 
 Additionally, capital budgeting is necessary in any case in view of 
expenditure control. Decision-making in central government on 
investment is subjected to the overall expenditure margins determined by 
the EMU deficit limit and the zero deficit targets actually preserved in 
the Netherlands. 
ACCOUNTING FOR RESOURCES AS A CONCEPT OF ACCRUALS 
 Notwithstanding all adjustments to assess capital costs, in the “State 
of the Art Budgeting” report (Ministry of Finance, 2001) the issue of 
accrual cost calculation is being rigorously simplified: (Cash) 
expenditure on all personnel and non fixed material resources is 
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immediately identified as “costs.” Obviously, substantial accrued 
expenses in government production may be ignored in this simplified 
accounting system. We doubt that the reform will substantially contribute 
to an improved efficiency in this production. 
 This simplification may be criticized more fundamentally with 
respect to the conception of ”accruals” implied in the current/capital 
distinction. Because this distinction applies to resources and not to 
activities, values created or lost through these activities cannot be 
recognized. The matching and realization principles binding resource 
costs to revenues cannot be applied to the ‘current costs’ calculated 
within the intended resource budgeting system. Values added cannot be 
assessed. Thus we may justly question whether the label ‘accrual 
accounting’ is misleading when applied to this reform as well as to the 
similar systems of resource budgeting in Australia, New Zealand and the 
UK. We develop our argument starting from the definitions of accrual 
accounting presented by the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC) Public Sector Committee that might constitute the basis of these 
reforms. 
 The development of IPSAS by the IFAC Public Sector Committee 
has already been thoroughly criticized by Chan (2001). Specifically we 
join him in his remark that “the IPSAS has emphasized financial 
accounting and external reporting to the neglect of budgeting” (Chan, 
2001, p. 2). Obviously, accrual accounting may be applied to financial 
reports independently from budgets eventually underlying financial 
decision-making. Thus efficiency may be assessed in ex post benefit-cost 
comparisons, regardless of judgments on legitimacy to be derived from 
compliance audits with respect to the decisions involved. IPSAS can 
thereby provide the guidelines for financial reporting, while budgetary 
accounting remains in vigor to establish compliance with authorized 
budgets.  
 Contrary to our analysis presented above, however, Chan (2001, p. # 
for quotes] characterizes budgetary accounting as emphasizing 
“executive accountability to legislature” – in opposition to 
“accountability to the electorate and general public.” Commitments and 
cash flows are considered by him as key financial measures in the first 
type of accountability, accruals in the last. Obviously, tuning government 
accounting to the electorate and the general public may be acknowledged 
a relevant objective. In his view, accrual accounting as such should not 
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be discussed but, rather, the neglect of government cost characteristics in 
the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) model 
underlying the IPSAS proposed: “the public goods nature (…) in 
addition to the government’s power to tax makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to recognize revenue on the basis of services rendered to 
individual tax payers” (for similar conclusions with respect to U.S. 
GASB and the choices made in GASB 34 to maintain financial resource 
measurement for government funds (Chan, 1999, pp. 378-379; Patton & 
Been, 2001, p. 35).  
 As Chan acknowledges, taxes, as non-reciprocal transactions, may be 
based upon equity rather than efficiency considerations. What kind of 
accruals, then, could Chan have in mind? Clearly, matching of costs to 
(tax) revenues will be impossible and irrelevant in that case. 
 In our analysis taxpayers will not try to establish the efficiency 
results of their tax contributions but the utilities to be derived from 
alternative spending objectives for these contributions. These objectives 
are specified in the programs for which budgets are being authorized. In 
accordance with these budgets, utilities to be derived from and 
contributions paid for these programs may be matched with each other – 
comparable to the decision making of the individual taxpayer with 
respect to his own consumption of his expendable income. Thus 
compliance to allocated budgets will not only be the primary focus of 
accountability for the legislature, but for the electorate and the general 
public as well. 
 In our view, the cash versus accruals debate with respect to IPSAS is 
biased by the definitions of accruals applied in the standards proposed. In 
the IFAC PSC definitions full accrual accounting is defined as 
accounting for economic resources (and changes therein) instead of the 
financial resources considered in cash, modified cash and restricted 
accrual accounting respectively. Accrual accounting is thus identified (by 
definition) with resource accounting – notwithstanding the failure to 
apply the realization and matching principles in all tax financed 
government activities being accounted for. In our view accounting for 
accruals should imply some assessment of value added in the use of 
resources. A distinction between resources consumed and resources 
transformed into other assets may only be derived from an investigation 
of the benefits resulting from their utilization. 
558  MOL & KRUIJF 
 
 
 Thus the cost concept can only be used in a system of resource 
accounting in a restricted sense. Cost accounts involved will only address 
these resources themselves (expenses on personnel and material), not the 
costs of the production eventually obtained.  
UNSOLVED HYBRIDITIES 
 Resource budgeting will be deficient from both perspectives of 
budgetary and commercial accounting. In budgetary accounting, 
compliance in decision making with authorizations should be assessed. 
Thus accounting should fulfill a transparency criterion to derive 
unambiguously the decisions to which the executive is being entitled by 
the legislator. Accounting for commitments cannot fulfill this 
requirement on its own, because of the (long term) uncertainties with 
respect to the precise amounts of money involved in the future and their 
incidence in annual budgets then. Accounting for expenditure has to join 
the commitments to authorize direct spending. Obviously, accounting for 
costs will not enhance this compliance – as is being acknowledged in the 
condition that cash accounting will have to be maintained in view of 
EMU budget limitations and resource control. Authorization 
requirements are thus not fulfilled in the resource budgets, neither with 
respect to controllability nor with respect to transparency of the budget. 
 Matching requirements from the perspective of commercial 
accounting are also not met in the application of resource budgeting. 
Expenses (adjusted expenditure on resources) are not matched to benefits 
(revenues) to obtain any evaluation of efficiency on resource 
consumption. Deficiencies symptomatic for cash accounting like the 
spending drive towards the end of the budget year will not be repaired by 
this reform. As the examples of Australia and New Zealand clarify, 
budgeting of adjusted expenditure remains budgeting for expenditure 
(Robinson, 2002). The benefits of resource budgeting will thus be limited 
to the assessment of full costs for a restricted category of capital outlays. 
The price to pay for these benefits – in terms of controllability and 
transparency - is high. 
 Recent awareness of the deficiencies in the concept of accruals 
underlying the intended Dutch reform has emerged. In March 2002, the 
label of accrual accounting was replaced by ‘state of the art budgeting’ in 
the internal documents produced in the implementation process within 
Dutch central government. Moreover, the consequences of the necessity 
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to conceive expenses as adjusted expenditures in budgetary accounting 
are acknowledged: specifically, the original expectations that the reform 
would end the end-of-year spending drive have been given up (as 
reported on the basis of evidence gathered by the Dutch department of 
Finance in Australia and New Zealand). 
 In the State of the Art Budgeting report a significant amendment was 
implied. Contrary to the intentions in the Budget Memorandum 2001, the 
dual system, including a differentiated accounting system in executive 
agencies, will be maintained. For the agencies, asset valuation will be 
based on (unadjusted) historic costs, in accordance with private sector 
practices and regulations for sub national government in the Netherlands.  
 These hesitations may pave the way for some reconsideration of the 
reform, and a revaluation of the potential of the present system. In our 
view the objectives of controllability and transparency on the one hand 
and effective allocation and efficient production on the other hand may 
be reconciled in this accounting system, by distinguishing systematically 
between current and capital expenditure in the budget and by redefining 
core government to agency relationships. Starting from an exposition of 
the major flaws of the present system we will try to argue our proposition 
that some minor corrections will suffice to adapt it to these objectives. 
HYBRIDITY IN GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING 
 In the introduction we touched upon the two partial solutions 
provided in the present Dutch central government accounting system to 
the deficiencies of cash/commitment accounting: (1) the creation of 
investment funds to counter the perceived crowding-out of investment by 
consumption and (2) the application of accrual accounting in 
governmental organizations provided (by law) with an ‘agency status’. 
The Minister of Finance initially defended both of these partial solutions 
in his 1997 memorandum entitled “From Expenditure to Cost” (Ministry 
of Finance, 1997) (which he later denounced in his 2001 Budget 
Memorandum). In that memorandum, he argued that capital investments 
– as recognized in business accounting - are not equal to expenditure for 
sustainable economic growth. The minister acknowledged that social 
investments like education do not coincide with the definition of capital 
expenditures agreed upon in the European System of Accounts, and that 
accrual accounting based on ESA would thus not optimize budget 
allocation from a social point of view. Furthermore, the minister argued 
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that accrual accounting would not make fiscal policy more transparent 
and would bias expenditure on investment in favor of national 
investment instead of capital transfer for investment purposes at 
decentralized levels of government. Notably, one of the justifications 
underlying the creation of special investment funds was, in his view, to 
optimize allocation of investments between national and local or regional 
levels. Thus, according to his 1997 memorandum, governmental capital 
expenditure should acknowledge all investment in “the physical, 
economic and social infrastructure” provided by the government to 
society. 
 Obviously, however, this requirement is not met by the present 
(partial) investment funds. These funds provide capital almost 
exclusively to projects with respect to the physical infrastructure, 
covering investment related to traffic and transport specifically. To fulfill 
the objective of the finance minister’s 1997 memorandum, a systematic 
distinction of capital from current expenditure is required. 
 Such a distinction of types of expenditure may easily be framed 
within the present cash/commitment accounting system (in fact it has 
been general practice in Dutch central government accounting until the 
adoption of the Budgeting and Accounting Act 1976). The criteria to be 
applied in such a separation should thereby constitute objects of political 
decision-making. Social circumstances may determine which type of 
expenditure may be classified as capital expenditure and be treated in 
budget allocation accordingly (after the Second World War, e.g., a 
capital account for ”reconstruction,” which has existed until 1958, was 
established in the Netherlands). 
 In our view the present cash/commitment accounting system may 
thus be amended by the separation of current and capital accounts. 
Governing political party coalitions may specify the criteria to be applied 
in the Governance Agreements underlying their cooperation. 
 In the 1997 memorandum the second bias mentioned in our 
introduction – the absence of information on efficiency – did not arise. It 
was assumed (by the minister of Finance) that the newly created agency 
status would provide an adequate solution to this bias, as agencies (in 
most cases comparable to US internal service funds) were required to 
apply full accrual accounting.  
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 Nevertheless, the efficiency improvements to be derived from the 
agency contracts were being contested by many observers. The 
contractual negotiations implied in the department-agency relations were 
often characterized as “playing a game.” Not the intended demand and 
supply relationship with the core departments, but the hierarchical 
subordination to these departments dominated the controls applied to 
agency activities. Notwithstanding the accounts for revenues and costs of 
their services, budgeted expenditure remained the primary focus of these 
controls. 
 In our view, the deficiencies observed in agency performance cannot 
be attributed to the agency status per se. Deficiencies in agency 
accounting requirements may be held responsible for them instead. The 
accounting systems imposed on the agencies only partially represent 
accrual accounting as applied in business. To a large extent elements of 
budgetary accounting remain in vigor, specifically with respect to 
authorization requirements for agency ”expense.” 
 These authorization requirements are derived from the principle that 
all government expenditure should be authorized. As agency revenues 
may partly consist of third party payments for services delivered, 
expenditure of the income thus generated should be authorized 
separately, in addition to the authorization of departmental spending on 
agency services. The solution to this authorization problem actually 
implies that agency expense budgets are authorized apart from 
departmental expenditure budgets (with some consolidated statement 
harmonizing expense/expenditure differences). In fact, agency expenses 
are subjected to a twofold authorization when they are paid for by central 
government itself: first, by authorization of expenditure in core 
departments on the agency services, and second by the authorization of 
the expense incurred in the agencies themselves.  
 Recognition of the hybridity implied in these twofold authorizations 
may suggest a more efficient solution. Authorizations with respect to 
third party payments might address those payments themselves: agency 
contracting may be subjected to authorizations with respect to potential 
clients and types and tariffs of services – and revenue generated from 
those services may be earmarked for their production. Additionally, of 
course, revenues from core government are already authorized through 
central government budgets. Thus, commercial accounting for the 
agencies does not have to be contaminated by any budgetary accounting 
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for their “expenses.” No direct authorizations are required with respect to 
the costs incurred in their production. 
 Contrary to resource accounting, full accrual accounting may then be 
applied to producing business units in government to assess value added 
(results obtained) in the actual supply of their services. Instead of a 
uniform system of resource budgeting to be applied in all government 
organizations, a consistent dual system of cash/commitment accounting 
for core government and accrual accounting for executive agencies will 
thereby be obtained. 
 In such a dual accounting system value for money from government 
production can be analysed with respect to effectiveness (utilities derived 
from budget spending) and efficiency (agency results in terms of 
revenues and costs). In the intended resource budgeting system no 
information on efficiency but only on economy – expense instead of 
expenditure for the means of production – will be provided. 
CONCLUSION 
 In conformity with similar reforms in New Zealand, Australia and 
the United Kingdom, the Dutch central government will replace its 
present cash/commitment budgeting with a system of resource 
budgeting. From this reform politicians expect an improvement in 
budgetary allocation on investment in government spending and an 
improvement of efficiency in government production. We argue that this 
reform ignores the hybridity of government in spending tax income on 
the one hand and creating value added on the other hand. Accounting for 
this hybridity requires a combined (dual) application of budgetary and 
commercial  accounting, not a compromise solution between these two 
systems. With some minor adjustments, the present Dutch accounting 
system of cash/commitment accounting for government core departments 
and accrual accounting for executive agencies, may meet these 
requirements adequately.  
NOTES 
1. A new government coalition (formed after elections in May 2002) 
formally endorsed the proposals in its budget memorandum 2003. 
However, this coalition had to resign already in October and new 
elections will be held in January 2003. Further developments in the 
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implementation process are not expected before a new minister of 
Finance will take office after these elections. 
2. Unlike American local governments, a Dutch local government 
cannot go bankrupt due to specific provisions in the financial 
relations between central and local government. The assessment of 
the financial position by financial intermediaries, which is one of the 
arguments for introducing GASB 34, is therefore of only limited 
relevance. 
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